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The revelations by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden have led to policy reform debates 
in several countries and to policy change in some, including a new legislative framework 
in the UK—the Investigatory Powers Act. In this article, we trace the forces and dynamics 
that have shaped this particular policy response. We investigate key controversies over 
the types and extent of surveillance; the capacity of different stakeholders to intervene 
into the debate and shape its outcomes; the attempts to achieve democratic legitimacy 
for data collection; and the consequences for digital citizenship. Drawing from a systematic 
analysis of relevant policy documents and interviews with key policy experts and 
stakeholders, we analyze conflicts over both the direction and details of surveillance policy, 
and uncover unequal degrees of influence over policy reform for different stakeholders. 
As a result, policy reform has led to a confirmation, rather than restriction, of data 
collection. Digital citizenship may be supported by the (limited) policy review in the UK 
and the development of a more transparent legislative framework, but is impeded by a 
growing range of surveillance capabilities. 
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Engagement with our social, political, and cultural environments is increasingly mediated through 
digital platforms. Citizens interact with public services through online tools, participate in online campaigns, 
express themselves online, share information and culture, and thus develop agency through digital 
environments. The evolution of these practices depends on a variety of factors, including the stability and 
integrity of the technical infrastructure, its accessibility, changes in cultural practices, and the legal and 
regulatory environment. Policies created by governments and Internet businesses are crucial in either 
enabling or restricting the various activities of online citizens. Policy debates on how state and commercial 
actors should support, limit, protect, or monitor people’s digital interactions are therefore crucial moments 
in the shaping of digital citizenship.  
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The revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden of the surveillance practices of American and 
British intelligence agencies have been such an extraordinary moment. From early June 2013, his leaks 
have been published in newspapers such as The Guardian and newer media platforms such as The Intercept, 
exposing a range of different means by which U.S. and partner state agencies collect and analyze Internet 
communications. The public have learnt previously undisclosed details of how data are harvested from the 
Internet’s backbone cables and collected from Internet companies and social media platforms. The 
revelations exposed efforts by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and the British Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to break encryption protocols and to hack into communications 
infrastructure. Besides high-profile cases of both business and political espionage, citizens learnt about the 
“bulk” collection of online data, including Web browsing histories, geolocations, text messages, and other 
everyday online practices.1 
 
The revelations have generated heated debates regarding the extent of state interference in civic 
life and the protection of civil rights in the context of security. They have led to calls for policy reform, legal 
challenges, and court proceedings; the establishment of parliamentary review committees and independent 
commissions; and new policies in several countries.  
 
In this article, we will explore these developments with a focus on one of the countries most affected 
by the Snowden leaks—the United Kingdom. Writing at the time of intense debate on a new law that 
regulates a wide range of data collection and surveillance capabilities, we analyze the breadth of different 
interests, controversial surveillance powers, and the role of different social forces in the shaping of a new 
policy environment in the UK. This allows us to understand the processes and directions of policy change at 
this historical juncture, when key coordinates for future digital citizenship are being designed. 
 
This article is based on two research methods: a systematic analysis of relevant policy documents, 
stakeholder statements, and court decisions, and a set of semistructured interviews with policy experts and 
stakeholders. The interviewees encompass Parliamentarians, security and law enforcement experts, and 
representatives of industry, civil society, and an oversight body. They include high-profile participants in the 
policy debate and policy development process in the UK that were able to provide in-depth insights into the 
challenges of shaping the regulatory cornerstones of digital citizenship. 
 
We will first outline the conceptual background that we adopt for this article and explain the 
research methods. Second, we will provide an overview of both the regulatory environment in the UK and 
recent post-Snowden transformations. Based on the interview findings, we will, third, discuss key 
controversies in the current policy reform debate and analyze the agendas and interventions of different 
                                                 
1 For an overview of surveillance capabilities, see Fidler (2015) and “NSA Files” by The Guardian 
(https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-nsa-files). For a systematic explanation of key programs, 
check the database developed by the “Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society” project 
(https://www.dcssproject.net/category/technology/surveillance-programmes). For a collection of all 
documents leaked by Snowden, see the Snowden Surveillance Archive by Canadian Journalists for Free 
Expression (https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/cgi-bin/library.cgi).  
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social, political, and economic forces as well as the level of public debate. Finally, we will identify implications 
for the future of digital citizenship and the relations between citizens and the state. 
 
Actors, Factors, and Contexts of Policy Reform 
 
Media and communication policy encompasses the regulatory rules and norms that shape 
communication infrastructures and uses. It explores how these norms are created, based on which values 
and interests, and how they shift. Policy analysis thus addresses existing legislation, court rulings, and 
government decisions, but it is also interested in the process of policy making as political negotiation 
between a variety of actors and interests. It highlights the conditions and implications of interactions 
between social forces and examines prevalent societal norms and ideologies that underlie and advance 
specific policy trends (Freedman, 2008). 
 
This multidimensional perspective is necessary as media and communications policy has become 
“a complex ecology of interdependent structures” with “a vast array of formal and informal mechanisms 
working across a multiplicity of sites” (Raboy, 2002, pp. 6–7). Classic forms of national (governmental and 
parliamentary) policy have “become embedded within more expansive sets of interregional relations and 
networks of power” (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 3), and policy authority is located at “different and sometimes 
overlapping levels—from the local to the supra-national and global” (Raboy & Padovani, 2010, p. 16). 
Regional associations such as the European Union (EU), international institutions such as the various United 
Nations (UN) agencies, and world summits and trade agreements all provide regulatory frameworks (and, 
in the case of the EU, also judicial institutions) that affect the development of national surveillance policy.  
 
Civil society organizations and the business sector engage with this complex environment. As 
institutional participants, they are increasingly part of multistakeholder processes that expand policy 
authority beyond governments. Internet governance has been a pioneer field for experiments in 
collaborative and nonstate policy making as both its history and its current institutions, such as the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), demonstrate (Mueller, 2010). Further, 
nongovernmental organizations and businesses have staged normative interventions into policy debate by 
setting agendas, exerting public pressure, lobbying and public campaigns, and by lending or withdrawing 
legitimacy to policy goals, decisions and processes (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  
 
Such interventions may support policy change in the event of a “policy window” (i.e., a favorable 
institutional, political, and sometimes ideological setting that provides a temporary opening for affecting 
policy change; Kingdon, 1984). Unforeseen revelations, catastrophes, economic crises, and political change 
can lead to such windows of opportunity. A crisis in the social, economic, or ideological system may also 
cause disunity among political elites and create a dynamic in which established social orders become 
receptive to change. “Policy monopolies”—stable configurations of policy actors—may be weakened or 
broken up as political constellations change and the balance of power shifts (Meyer, 2005). 
 
Through the development of standards and protocols that have become de facto cornerstones of 
communication technology, as well as “privacy by design” strategies that incorporate concerns about civil 
rights into the technical infrastructure, nonstate actors have also preempted other forms of regulation and 
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thus practiced a latent and largely invisible form of policymaking (DeNardis, 2009; Gürses, Troncoso, & 
Diaz, 2011; Lessig, 1999). More openly, social media platforms and other online businesses have applied 
“terms of service” to regulate the use of their platforms and set the conditions for free speech and privacy 
(Youmans & York, 2012). Complementing state policy, these forms of privatized policy making (Hintz, 2015) 
demonstrate a “shift of responsibility . . . onto strategically positioned private sector intermediaries” 
(Mueller, 2010, p. 149). This interplay of different forces in the shaping of the regulatory environment has 
been reflected in theoretical approaches informed by, among others, political-economic concerns 
(Chakravartty & Zhao, 2008; Freedman, 2008), science and technology studies (Musiani, 2015), and social 
movement studies (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). 
 
The interaction of public and private actors at different levels is, furthermore, ingrained in 
contemporary forms of surveillance. The Snowden revelations focused largely on state surveillance by 
agencies such as the NSA and GCHQ, but they also pointed to state reliance on commercial 
telecommunications and social media platforms in gathering vast amounts of user data (Lyon, 2014). 
Telecommunications companies such as AT&T and British Telecom have long been active partners in state 
surveillance of their customers (European Parliament, 2001). Online platforms such as Facebook and Google 
have become key “data mines” (Andrejevic, 2012, p. 71) due to their inherent goal of maximizing 
(corporate) surveillance to enable targeted advertising, and the data volunteered by users to social media 
is analyzed by both commercial data brokers and state agencies (Trottier, 2015).  
 
Networked data flows are thus subject to multiple processes of “veillance” (Bakir, 2015; Haggerty 
& Ericson, 2000). These constrain and regulate the interactions of digital citizens with their online 
environment (Isin & Ruppert, 2015), for example, through the “chilling effect” that may lead to caution and 
self-censorship when one is under observation (Hampton et al., 2014; PEN, 2013; see also the article by 
Dencik and Cable in this Special Section). 
 
Methodology 
 
This article is based on a combination of two sets of research methods to gain an in-depth 
understanding of surveillance policy development and its challenges and controversies. First, we conducted 
a systematic review of relevant policy documents, stakeholder statements, and court decisions that provide 
key markers of surveillance policy development in the UK. This review led to a publicly available database 
of policy institutions, decisions, and surveillance power.2 The overview of UK surveillance policy in the next 
section is based on this work. Second, we conducted 13 semistructured interviews with policy stakeholders 
and experts from a variety of stakeholder communities. The interview participants are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Interviewees. 
 
                                                 
2 See http://www.dcssproject.net/policy/. The database was largely developed by Dr. Josh Cowls at Oxford 
University. 
International Journal of Communication 11(2017)  Enabling Digital Citizenship?  5 
Sector Interviewee Marked as 
Politics (Pol) Former Member of Parliament (2010–2015) and of 
the Home Affairs Select Committee 
Interviewee 1, Pol 
Peer in the House of Lords Interviewee 2, Pol 
Peer in the House of Lords Interviewee 3, Pol 
Security and law 
enforcement (Sec) 
Cybersecurity researcher and former member of the 
British military 
Interviewee 4, Sec 
Retired senior intelligence official Interviewee 5, Sec 
Senior law enforcement officer Interviewee 6, Sec 
Industry (Ind) Program Manager at British technology industry trade 
association 
Interviewee 7, Ind 
Vice president of security services company Interviewee 8, Ind 
Policy manager at international Internet services 
corporation 
Interviewee 9, Ind 
Civil society (CS) Director of British digital rights coalition Interviewee 10, CS 
Policy officer of civil liberties organization Interviewee 11, CS 
Chief executive of privacy campaign organization Interviewee 12, CS 
Review and oversight 
(Rev) 
Official of the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner’s Office 
Interviewee 13, Rev 
 
The interviews were carried out between August 2015 and February 2016, and thus during a time of intense 
debate in the UK over the introduction of a major surveillance law, the Investigatory Powers Bill. A first draft 
of the Bill was published in October 2015, a slightly revised version was introduced to Parliament in March 
2016, and the Bill was finally adopted (and thus became the Investigatory Powers Act) in November 2016. 
Six of the interviews were conducted in person, seven over the phone or on Skype, lasting on average one 
hour. They focused on the concept of surveillance, key policy controversies, the new Bill, and the roles and 
interests of different stakeholders in the policy debate. The research benefitted from the fact that we had 
access to senior experts and key participants of the national policy debate, who not only explained core 
positions of their respective sector but also offered personal accounts of the policy development process. 
The interviews thus provided us with significant insights into the shaping of surveillance policy. The research 
was conducted as part of the project “Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK State-Media-Citizen 
Relations After the Snowden Leaks” (2014–2016).3 
 
 
 
Surveillance Policy in the UK 
 
                                                 
3 The project was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council. 
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Until 2016, law enforcement and intelligence agency data collection and analysis in the UK were 
regulated by a jigsaw puzzle of different laws that each address specific aspects and practices. In the 
following, we outline central components of this (largely) pre-Snowden regulatory framework, based on 
document analysis and the above-mentioned database. This policy environment has included, for example, 
the Data Protection Act of 1998, which controls access to and use of personal data. It provides limitations 
for data collection and sharing but also includes exemptions for the protection of “national security” and the 
prevention or detection of crime. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) from 2000, as amended 
by the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, allows a Secretary of State to authorize the 
interception of the communications of a specific individual but also of wide-ranging and vaguely defined 
types of traffic in bulk (Brown, 2014).  
 
These more specific regulations of data interception are underpinned by older laws, such as the 
Telecommunications Act of 1984, which offers the Secretary of State interception powers in communications 
networks, and the Intelligence Services Act of 1994, which provides the core legal basis for the surveillance 
activities by GCHQ. While it limits GCHQ’s lawful activities to “interests of national security,” such 
interests have traditionally been broadly interpreted in UK law. More recent legislation, such as the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act of 2006, has updated and extended older powers for the interception of communication. 
 
A number of oversight bodies review these surveillance capabilities and their implementation. They 
include, on a one-off basis, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Intelligence and Law Enforcement Data 
Sharing and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (appointed by the Secretary of State), and 
on an ongoing basis, the Intelligence Services Commissioner; the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner; and the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament. The Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal (IPT) has exclusive jurisdiction to hear complaints about the intelligence agencies or interception. 
 
These national rules, institutions, and processes are embedded in regional and international policy, 
such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
which was incorporated into UK law in the Human Rights Act of 1998. Article 8 of the Convention guarantees 
everyone’s “right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” (Council of 
Europe, 1950, Art. 8). Regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), can hear 
complaints about surveillance and advise on its lawfulness. Directives adopted by the European 
Commission—such as the Data Retention Directive from 2006—have to be implemented by all member 
states and thus have far-reaching consequences for national law. Yet so have policy revisions, such as the 
decision in 2014 by the Court of Justice of the European Union to revoke the Directive. Complementing 
these instances of “hard law,” normative institutions such as the UN Special Rapporteurs on freedom of 
expression and on privacy influence the limits of acceptable behavior by states. 
 
The Snowden revelations, initially, did not lead to any significant overhaul of surveillance powers 
in the UK. On the contrary, the revocation of the EU Data Retention Directive in 2014 led the UK government 
to propose and adopt the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers (DRIP) Act to continue key provisions of 
the Directive. Plans for a Communications Data Bill—nicknamed the “snooper’s charter”—were advanced by 
the Conservative majority in the coalition government of 2010–2015, but halted because of resistance by 
the junior party in the coalition, the Liberal Democrats. One of the first announcements by Tory party 
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ministers on the morning of their election victory in 2015 was to move ahead with this Bill (Gayle, 2015), 
which would vastly expand data interception and collection.  
 
However, several developments in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations influenced the course 
of the policy debate. To start with, judicial challenges of both the activities of security agencies and national 
legislation highlighted a need for substantial policy review. These included a successful High Court challenge 
to DRIPA by the MPs David Davis and Tom Watson, which declared a section of DRIPA unlawful and required 
new replacement legislation. Campaign organizations such as Privacy International, Liberty, and Amnesty 
International challenged GCHQ’s surveillance practices at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), which 
decided that the agency’s activities were broadly compatible with the European Convention’s privacy and 
freedom of expression guarantees, but that the sharing of data between GCHQ and NSA, and the spying on 
human rights organizations by GCHQ, were unlawful. Appeals of these decisions, and further lawsuits 
including by the civil society groups Open Rights Group, Big Brother Watch, and English PEN, were brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
Further, several institutional reviews in the first half of 2015 raised concerns with the legitimacy 
and legal grounding of surveillance practices. Most prominently, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation criticized the legal framework as “obscure,” “undemocratic,” and “intolerable” (Anderson, 2015, 
p. 13) and called for a significant review and redevelopment. Further reports were published by the ISC 
(ISC, 2015) and the Independent Surveillance Review of RUSI (2015), which called for a “democratic 
license” (p. 97) for the surveillance activities of intelligence agencies.  
 
At the international level, United Nations rapporteurs have condemned surveillance in stronger 
terms. A few days before the first Snowden leaks were published in June 2013, then-UN Special Rapporteur 
on the right to freedom of expression and opinion Frank La Rue highlighted the right to privacy as an 
essential requirement for the realization of the right to freedom of expression (La Rue, 2013). His successor, 
David Kaye, has emphasized the essential role of encryption and anonymity for people’s rights to freedom 
of opinion and expression (Kaye, 2015), and the newly appointed Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy 
has criticized the surveillance practices and insufficient legal restrictions of countries such as the UK. While 
these UN reports have had a less immediate effect on national policy development, they have underlined 
and legitimized criticism from civil society and have reinforced public pressure for policy change. 
 
British civil society organizations and campaign groups have exerted pressure by issuing 
statements regarding their concerns about surveillance, organizing public debates, lobbying legislators, and 
expanding their membership. A coalition was formed—Don’t Spy On Us—which has combined some of this 
advocacy work toward a common campaign. Significantly, Internet companies have been increasingly vocal 
in their criticism of large-scale surveillance, too. Concerned about the implications of the Snowden 
revelations for user trust in their services, they have focused more attention on data security and user 
privacy, and advocated for policy reform.4 This has introduced tensions into the relationship between 
governments and the corporate sector and has separated, to some extent, the powerful forces of 
government and Internet business (Wizner, 2015).  
                                                 
4 See, e.g., https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/ 
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These tensions have been reflected in strong pressure by British politicians and security agencies 
on companies to comply with data requests by the state. GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan has called social 
media networks “terrorists’ command and control networks of choice” (Hannigan, 2014, para. 6) and then-
Prime Minister David Cameron demanded that they “do more to co-operate with the intelligence agencies” 
(Watt & Wintour, 2015, para. 3). Both the British Prime Minister and the Home Secretary called for limits to 
encryption and for legal backdoors to enable data monitoring by security agencies (Temperton, 2015). 
Companies like Apple, on the other hand, have strongly condemned the weakening of encryption systems 
(Quinn, 2015).  
 
In response to all these dynamics, the government presented comprehensive new draft legislation 
in October 2015 to combine the fragmented legislative framework of data collection and analysis into one 
law. The purpose of the Investigatory Powers Bill (IP Bill) was to regulate a wide range of surveillance 
practices—from bulk data collection to “computer network exploitation” (i.e., hacking). It constituted a 
significant shift in British surveillance policy by opening up many of the traditionally secret surveillance 
measures to public scrutiny and oversight. However, the substance of surveillance powers largely remained 
and partly expanded (as we will explore below). 
 
The mixed picture of surveillance reform in the UK is reflected by developments elsewhere. In 
countries like France and Denmark, new laws to strengthen surveillance capabilities were adopted in 
response to recent terrorist attacks (Treguer, 2015). In the United States, on the other hand, the USA 
Freedom Act, which was adopted in May 2015, restricts data collection by state agencies and thus reversed 
a trend toward ever-increasing surveillance for the first time since the 1970s (Wizner, 2015). The 
communications law “Marco Civil” in Brazil provides stronger protection of citizens’ privacy and anonymity 
online (Medeiros & Bygrave, 2015). Thus, the trend globally is differentiated, and while formal policy reform 
in some countries extends the legal use of surveillance capabilities, in other countries we have witnessed a 
pushback on state powers in light of the Snowden revelations. 
 
Interests and Controversies: The Struggle Over Issues 
 
The challenge of developing a commonly accepted policy framework for data collection and 
interception begins with the definition of “surveillance.” As our interviews have shown, different stakeholders 
have incompatible understandings of what it means. The majority of interview participants regarded 
surveillance as a broad term that “refers to people being watched, monitored, data collected in almost any 
sense” (Interviewee 1, Pol). Surveillance, for them, starts at the point of intercepting and collecting data as 
this implies “the ability or the power to look into the records or the communications of individuals” 
(Interviewee 7, Ind). Privacy interference therefore “begins at the point of collection” (Interviewee 11, CS), 
which is a view supported by both surveillance studies scholars and court decisions (cf. Royal Courts of 
Justice, 2015, para. 114).  
 
In contrast, members of the security sector and a minority of interviewees from politics and industry 
regard “surveillance as being something that is targeted against a particular agent—somebody who does 
something for a purpose that is tied to security” (Interviewee 4, Sec). Data collection thus “becomes 
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surveillance when it is actually looked at or analyzed” (Interviewee 8, Ind), that is, during “an actual targeted 
operation” (Interviewee 6, Sec), whereas data collection alone is merely intelligence gathering. These 
interviewees accepted that “privacy rights are engaged the moment the police service or an intelligence 
agency starts to plan a collection operation” (Interviewee 5, Sec), but maintained that “the real substantive 
invasion of privacy comes when the human analyst gets to see the material” (Interviewee 5, Sec). 
 
The entry of automated profiling and machine-based analysis of datasets complicates the matter, 
though, as studies of big data (e.g., Kitchin, 2014) and its use in policing (e.g., Dencik, Hintz, Carey, & 
Pandya, 2015) have shown. Some interviewees felt that “it’s probably more intrusive to have a 
machine . . . algorithmically assessing who is a threat and who is of interest” (Interviewee 11, CS), even 
though others maintained that “using automated search on specific targets is still a decision” by a human 
officer (Interviewee 4, Sec). 
 
This debate has particular implications for the key element in Snowden’s initial revelations and in 
much of the debate since—the mass or bulk collection of data. Law enforcement claims it is necessary to 
collect a vast trove of data to conduct (authorized and targeted) investigations of crime and threats to 
national security. “After an incident, when you know the identity of the suicide bomber, you need to find 
out who was that phone in contact with over the last couple of months, and so you need to retain that data” 
(Interviewee 5, Sec). Even though, personally, officers may feel “uneasy” with bulk collection, “there is no 
other way of doing it” (Interviewee 6, Sec). Yet civil society respondents pointed to those programs revealed 
by Snowden (e.g., “Karma Police”) that focused not necessarily on crime or terrorism, but on collecting data 
on a broad range of targets that have, in the past, included human rights organizations (Interviewee 11, 
CS). With bulk collection being a serious intrusion into people’s privacy, some declared to be “absolutely 
opposed to any bulk powers” (Interviewee 11, CS) and “any preemptive collection and retention just in case 
someone commits a crime” (Interviewee 9, Ind). Bulk powers, as several interviewees claim, are hard to 
justify regarding their proportionality, and the evidence of their necessity is unclear: “Lots of cases involve 
it, but that’s not the same as it is essential. Lots of cases involve using a pencil. If there weren’t any pencils, 
you’d use pens; the case would probably still go ahead” (Interviewee 1, Pol). Further, and in light of recent 
attacks in Europe that took place despite the wide availability of data, questions are raised regarding the 
effectiveness of mass data collection (Interviewee 2, Pol), and concerns exist about the extension of bulk 
powers in the IP Bill, for example, with the introduction of “thematic” (rather than individual) warrants and 
the collection of “Internet connection records” (i.e., people’s browsing history). 
 
With the conflict between the FBI and Apple over the accessibility of data stored on phones, the 
issue of encryption came to the forefront of surveillance-related controversies during the time of research. 
Surprisingly, then, it was the issue of least disagreement among interview participants. All highlighted the 
importance of strong encryption for digital business and online communication, and many recognized the 
risks of interfering with it. The Prime Minister’s statements about preventing encryption were widely rejected 
(comments ranged from “naïve” to “foolish” to “wasn’t briefed properly”). Yet a law enforcement official did 
point to the challenge that encrypted communication provides for their work (Interviewee 6, Sec). The 
common agenda was therefore not so much a concern for anonymity as for the preservation of user trust 
in the technology. The assumption of backdoors and compromised security would likely have the 
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“unintended consequence” of criminal networks and other target communities developing new encryption 
systems or going offline (Interviewee 8, Ind). 
 
Industry representatives emphasized the need for future legislation to allow end-to-end encryption 
without government intervention and without liability to provide decrypted data upon government request. 
They accepted the need to provide customer data in response to a legal and proportionate warrant if the 
company is in possession of a decryption key, but not to design or rearchitect systems to allow agency 
access (Interviewee 7, Ind). While civil society members agreed with this approach, law enforcement noted 
that requiring the production of a decryption key would not be feasible if a service provider is located outside 
the UK or a country with which an agreement to that effect exists (Interviewee 6, Sec). 
 
As encryption makes basic interception of communication more complex, state-sponsored hacking 
into a system—also called “equipment interference” or “computer network exploitation” (CNE)—will be an 
increasingly prominent method of surveillance. None of the interviewed stakeholders rejected the possibility 
of targeted hacking of a particular device to find information about a particular person, provided it was 
“controlled and limited” (Interviewee 7, Ind), “appropriately authorized, well documented, and well 
overseen” (Interviewee 10, CS), but bulk hacking (as allowed by the IP Bill) was widely seen as highly 
problematic. As inserting malware on a particular software can affect thousands of users and can potentially 
spread, the proportionality of such measures is particularly difficult to assess. Bulk hacking was thus 
described as “absurd and dangerous” (Interviewee 11, CS). Further, with the emerging Internet of Things, 
connected and thus exploitable devices encompass household items, cars, medical equipment, and public 
utilities, and the consequences of hacking such devices are difficult to foresee. For law enforcement, this 
brings about a vast new set of data sources (“We’re getting quite excited about the Internet of Things,” 
Interviewee 6, Sec) but also a particular need for safeguards and oversight. 
 
Controversies over oversight have focused on both its scope and the actors involved. Interviewees 
from the law enforcement and intelligence sector pointed to the need for political accountability (Interviewee 
4, Sec) and thus political review (Interviewee 5, Sec). Most others highlighted the need for independent 
judicial oversight and technological expertise (e.g., Interviewees 7 & 8, Ind). The inclusion of technical skills 
and broader (including civil society) perspectives in oversight regimes would be necessary, as was noted, 
for complex decisions in emerging areas such as CNE and automated data filtering (Interviewee 13, Rev). 
With GCHQ intercepting 50 billion communications a day and the Home Secretary signing several thousand 
warrants a year, judges would need to be equipped with adequate time and capacity to review requests, 
and those requests would require a high level of specificity to properly consider proportionality (Interviewee 
10, CS).5 
 
Finally, Internet traffic inevitably involves cross-border flows, which provides challenges for 
national regulation. First, the extraterritorial reach of legislation such as the IP Bill may contradict laws in 
other countries, and companies overseas may thus be forced to comply with different and potentially 
                                                 
5 The new Investigatory Powers Commission will include a bench of judges, but falls short of these broader 
proposals. 
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incompatible laws (Interviewee 7, Ind). Second, UK law may serve as a model for other countries to address 
digital surveillance, which may exacerbate the problem of extraterritoriality and make UK companies subject 
to legislation elsewhere. To address this issue and avoid “an absurd patchwork of laws” (Interviewee 9, 
Ind), several interviewees pointed to the need for international agreements, particularly an international 
framework for data sharing. Third, the international dimension of comprehensive UK legislation highlights 
its normative and symbolic character. Civil society members were particularly worried that “Britain will be a 
global leader in surveillance. . . . Is this something that we want to export? Is this the kind of standard 
setting that we want to be making for the world?” (Interviewee 10, CS). 
 
The Role of Social Forces: Impacts on Policy Change 
 
The role of the Snowden revelations in triggering policy reform was widely accepted among 
interviewees. By exposing the secret practices of intelligence agencies, Snowden enabled a both public and 
political debate. This vindicated those (typically from civil society) who had previously warned against 
surveillance, and it alerted Parliamentarians “that a lot of what we had been told was rather incomplete” 
(Interviewee 1, Pol). It led to the reviews mentioned (Anderson, 2015; ISC, 2015; RUSI, 2015), which 
“pushed the idea that powers should be more explicit” (Interviewee 1, Pol). The post-Snowden climate, as 
one campaigner noted, forced committees such as the ISC “to look strong, as a genuine and legitimate 
body” (Interviewee 10, CS) and opened an opportunity for in-depth and critical investigations. The legal 
challenges against surveillance which provided further urgency for policy reform relied on the Snowden 
documents, too: “We have the Snowden documents as a compass . . . you need a compass to know what 
you’re aiming at” (Interviewee 10, CS). Most interviewees agreed that the policy reform debate “would not 
have happened without Snowden.” 
 
Snowden also had significant effects on the business sector and triggered its involvement in policy 
reform. The leaks “made industry furious” (Interviewee 9, Ind) as they exposed, for example, practices of 
hacking into corporate servers. They led to a “massive loss in confidence from users [which] had large 
ramifications for industry [and] resulted in a lot of work to try and regain that trust” (Interviewee 7, Ind). 
Customers have become particularly “wary of the relationship between the security services and companies” 
(Interviewee 7, Ind). Further, mistrust in U.S.- and UK-based cloud services has led to “inefficiencies by 
continuing to invest in noncloud ways of doing things” (Interviewee 8, Ind) and has risked competitive 
disadvantages for British businesses as “those same concerns we’re already seeing with Western European 
businesses not wanting to deal with an American company could start happening to UK based companies as 
well” (Interviewee 8, Ind). 
 
The effect of the Snowden revelations was also acknowledged by security and intelligence experts 
who noted that “Snowden has pushed the policy debate forward and forced us to review policy” (Interviewee 
4, Sec). The leaks required security agencies “to talk about these issues more and more, and rightly so,” in 
the words of one officer, as “we police by consent in this country and we’re dependent on people tacitly 
supporting our activities” (Interviewee 6, Ind). Yet these would be agreeable side effects of revelations that 
were otherwise deemed illegitimate as, according to this section of interviews, Snowden exposed intelligence 
capabilities to criminals, led to the shutdown of necessary information feeds, and thereby “pulled the rug 
out from under us” (Interviewee 6, Ind). One intelligence expert questioned Snowden’s role for policy reform 
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more substantially and pointed instead to a historic process of bringing the state’s secret activities under 
the rule of law, and interpreted the [at the time of the interview] draft IP Bill as the end of this process. 
“Would this have happened without Snowden? I think it would, but it [the leaks] accelerated the recognition 
that this final stage of the rule of law should be put in place” (Interviewee 5, Ind). 
 
If Snowden triggered, or at least accelerated policy change, development and implementation of 
reform would depend, first of all, on government, Parliament, and the political context. Until 2015, the 
Liberal Democrat Party—as junior partner in the coalition government—offered some resistance to the 
expansion of surveillance powers and represented a voice for critical perspectives from civil liberty groups 
and the technology industry. Generally, however, the response to Snowden “was astonishingly muted” 
(Interviewee 1, Pol) in Parliament. Partly this was due to a lack of understanding of complex technical issues, 
and of “the time and exposure to be able to get the knowledge that this world sometimes demands” 
(Interviewee 3, Pol). In both the Commons and the Lords, members have had to deal with a variety of 
issues:  
 
We’ve got all this other . . . legislation coming through—the Housing Bill, the Energy Bill. 
From a human rights point of view, they’re probably more widespread than the 
surveillance issue and so a lot of Peers are directing their energies to those. (Interviewee 
2, Pol)  
 
Furthermore, criticism of security agencies is rare. As a former MP noted, “I think there’s a certain deference 
to agencies here, unlike the U.S. which has experience of McCarthy and all sorts of other intelligence gone 
wrong scenarios, and unlike Germany” (Interviewee 1, Pol). In addition, some MPs were subjected to 
pressure from government “to defend the agencies” (Interviewee 1, Pol). Both the Commons and the Lords 
eventually adopted the Bill despite a lack of substantial revisions that had been demanded by a wide range 
of experts and stakeholders (see below) as well as parliamentary review committees.6 Parliamentary control 
of government was thus ineffective. 
 
This role was occupied in part by civil society. Whereas historically, campaign groups and advocacy 
organizations were not involved by government in internal surveillance policy debates, they have 
increasingly been recognized as a legitimate actor with relevant expertise and are “less being seen as the 
angry voice and rather as a useful collaborative voice” (Interviewee 12, CS). This, however, has affected 
civil society strategies as the classic approach of opposition to surveillance has, in some cases, given way 
to a more nuanced discussion: “Previously NGOs would have fought just to kill a new law and probably been 
unsuccessful in doing so; now they can say: here’s how we can genuinely improve it and have a proper 
conversation with the Home Office” (Interviewee 10, CS). This has enabled civil society to participate in a 
key policy process, but it has also risked the normalization of surveillance as principled opposition is replaced 
by collaboration, and it has exposed differences in civil society agendas. While some value “the ability now 
to have very complicated policy discussions with intelligence officials” (Interviewee 10, CS) and aim at 
“chipping away at the mountain of surveillance rather than trying to take the whole thing down” (Interviewee 
                                                 
6 See http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/draft-investigatory-
powers-bill/news-parliament-2015/report-published/ 
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12, CS), others fear that a focus on the specifics of the IP Bill—and the new friendliness with security 
agencies—have compromised civil society principles regarding a more fundamental review of surveillance 
practices. “Some are still steadfast, but I think some are now thinking: How can we just get things to be 
better? Some, not all, are slightly more accepting of the basic premise of bulk data collection” (Interviewee 
11, CS). The diverse positions of civil society organizations were reflected in the large amount of submissions 
to review processes and many public statements, but hardly affected the various drafts of the policy text. 
 
The technology business sector served as the other voice of strong criticism against an expansion 
of surveillance capabilities (see aforementioned), and large Internet companies like Apple, Facebook, and 
Google issued common statements in condemnation of key parts of the IP Bill,7 but just like the civil society 
contributions, these received little traction. Access by industry to the policy development process was better 
than that of civil society, and business was consulted in the early stages of drafting (Interviewee 7, Ind). 
Despite that, industry representatives did not feel that their opinions were taken on board.  
 
Security and intelligence agencies were involved in policy reform discussions from the outset and 
were thus able to shape the new legislation in more detail. For example, the time frame of one year for data 
retention, as adopted in the IP Bill, was based on a suggestion by the National Crime Agency (Interviewee 
5, Sec) and it was not changed despite heavy criticism from most other participants and observers. Even 
though agency officials claim that not all their concerns were incorporated in the bill (Interviewee 6, Sec), 
they enjoyed the closest access to decision makers. They benefited from an institutional arrangement that 
placed the Home Office (which is responsible for domestic security) at the center of the policy reform 
process, which provided security and intelligence agencies with a “hotline” (Interviewee 1, Pol) to 
lawmakers, while interests that may have offered a counterbalance (civil liberty, freedom of expression, and 
privacy) were based at the Ministry of Justice and thus outside the core process. Further, agency concerns 
received support from the Home Office’s Director General of Security and Counterterrorism who, according 
to a former Parliamentarian, “saw his role not as a filter, but as an advocate” (Interviewee 1, Pol) for the 
expansion of surveillance powers. 
Different levels of access to decision makers thus played a significant role in the shaping of policy 
reform. While most of the publicly available consultations were critical of the proposed Bill, the supporters 
of the Bill had internal communication channels at their disposal and managed to advance their interests 
through those without major resistance. The agendas of law enforcement and agencies to expand data 
collection and demand more powers follow logically from their social role and remit, yet the institutional 
processes of balancing benefits and risks by incorporating different perspectives were underdeveloped. 
 
A Democratic License? Transparency and Public Debate 
 
A key criticism of the reviews published in 2015 was the obscure nature of the policy framework in 
the UK. Accordingly, the increase in transparency of the new Bill was widely acknowledged. Business 
representatives supported “the effort of bringing together all these different pieces of counterterrorism and 
surveillance legislation under one single Bill” (Interviewee 7, Ind) “within a well-understood, controlled, and 
regulated framework” (Interviewee 8, Ind). Civil society members applauded “the fact that it is the most 
                                                 
7 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/investigatorypowers/Memo/IPB21.htm  
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transparent bit of legislation that Britain’s ever had” (Interviewee 10, CS), and law enforcement officials 
praised the “clearer framework and clearer guidelines” for their work (Interviewee 6, Sec) that codify “how 
under the rule of law you can encompass activity which is, the public thinks, necessary” (Interviewee 5, 
Sec). 
 
Beyond the general recognition of improved transparency, however, views differ widely on whether 
the Bill can provide the “democratic license” that the RUSI report (2015) called for. The core of the critique 
has been that an opportunity for a fundamental review of surveillance practices and capabilities was lost. 
Instead, the main purpose of the new law was seen “to justify essentially previous secret practice” 
(Interviewee 10, CS): It is aiming “to legitimize existing behavior rather than to enter into a debate about 
what should be done” (Interviewee 10, CS). In the words of a Peer in the House of Lords: “This Bill is 
covering their backs. It’s saying that all these things they’ve been doing for years will now be legal. It’s a 
bit like pulling a skirt down after you’ve exposed your ankles” (Interviewee 2, Pol).  
 
The Snowden revelations called for a broader public debate on surveillance practices and the 
development of the Bill could have been an occasion to have this societal conversation. However, most 
interviewees agreed that a true public debate has not yet taken place. While debates on, for example, bulk 
collection were happening in the United States and elsewhere, “we haven’t had the chance to have that in 
the UK” (Interviewee 7, Ind). On the contrary, just as earlier legislation (DRIPA) had been rushed through 
Parliament under the pretense of an “emergency” (Interviewee 11, CS), it was criticized that the timetable 
for Parliamentary review of the Bill did not leave sufficient time for expert scrutiny, let alone public debate. 
Members of the law enforcement community recognized that “we should have a public debate” (Interviewee 
6, Sec), but maintained that a certain level of secret intelligence would be necessary and inevitable. 
Therefore the public would need to trust in the new processes, including its oversight mechanisms, as “the 
best device that democracy has come up with is trust by proxy” (Interviewee 5, Sec). However this view is 
unlikely to convince those who maintain that the abuse of trust by state agencies lies at the core of the 
surveillance problem. 
 
The limited debate that did take place, some felt, was dominated by a security discourse and—
similar to the policy development—by information provided through intelligence agencies, government and 
law enforcement. These actors “are in control of the information that we have and that we don’t have and 
therefore are able to move the goalposts of the debate” (Interviewee 11, CS). Overall, while transparency 
and openness have been a key factor in the recent UK policy debate, most stakeholders—for varying 
reasons—would agree that an extensive public discussion on the future of surveillance policy has not yet 
taken place.  
 
Digital Citizenship and the State 
 
If citizenship denotes people’s role in democratic society, their active engagement with their 
environment, and their relation with the state, surveillance policy affects all these aspects. It regulates the 
digitally mediated ways in which individuals increasingly interact with society (and which include some of 
the most intimate parts of people’s lives); it constrains the extent of privacy and free communication that 
is available; and it redefines the power of the state vis-à-vis its citizens. Yet the standards by which 
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surveillance policy is discussed and decided, in these current times, are questions of security—more 
specifically, “a very unique and defined area of national security” (Interviewee 4, Sec) rather than other 
possible concerns around, for example, human security. This focus on national security highlights the needs 
of the state, and it serves as a dominant framework of debate. It emphasizes the role of security services, 
and it deprioritizes other concerns (Interviewee 2, Pol). 
 
Several interviewees emphasized the need to, instead, start the discussion from the citizen’s 
perspective and “flip the switch from state- to citizen-centric thinking” (Interviewee 3, Pol). The focus, 
according to a business representative, should not be to make the life of intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement easier, but on the stability and safety of technical infrastructure and the security of the user 
(Interviewee 8, Ind). An intelligence expert expressed the hope that the combination of the Snowden 
revelations with the recognition of persistent terror threats would lead to “digital reconciliation in which 
these different currents of opinion come together—privacy concerns, concerns about oversight, and concerns 
about security and public safety” (Interviewee 5, Sec).  
 
Despite the acceptance that security risks exist, other participants maintained that bulk data 
collection, in particular, leads to a transformation in the nature of the relationship between the citizen and 
the state. It means that all citizens’ most personal data and communication is potentially scrutinized, 
searched, and profiled, and that citizens become suspects, particularly if they choose to exert their privacy 
and apply measures against the collection of their data (Interviewee 11, CS). The particular significance of 
this shift in power between state and citizen through surveillance policy lies in the risk of surveillance for 
constraining free expression, dissident communication and organizing, and other key elements of digital 
citizenship. An overreach in surveillance capabilities and practices may thus lead to sustained degradation 
of democracy (Interviewee 11, CS).  
 
This research has focused on state-based data collection and surveillance as the latter is highlighted 
by both the Snowden revelations and the recent UK policy reform. As noted, vast amounts of personal data 
are also collected and analyzed by Internet businesses, and several interviewees (particularly from the 
security community) pointed to the risks associated with these practices. Others defended the focus on state 
surveillance as, they said, it takes place in secret, without consent, and may have legal and safety-related 
repercussions (Interviewee 9, Ind). A concern with digital citizenship must not forget the implications of 
private sector-based data collection, but will necessarily emphasize the dimension of state–citizen relations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Snowden revelations have opened a policy window for debates on legislative reform. A 
combination of legal challenges, parliamentary reviews, and normative interventions forced the UK 
government to develop a new legislative framework whose openness and transparency has been praised. 
However, as we have seen, intense controversies over both the broader direction and the details of 
surveillance policy, as well as the very definition of surveillance, prevail. While the development of a new 
law has facilitated an exchange between different stakeholders and led to a more nuanced relationship 
between them, fundamental differences in opinion remain regarding both the substance of and the process 
toward the new legal framework.  
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Different levels of access to decision makers as well as specific institutional settings have led to 
unequal degrees of influence over policy reform and an imbalance in the voices and interests that are 
represented. Even though the vast majority of public contributions and review commissions (as well as 
interview participants for this study) were critical of the proposed legal frameworks of data collection, the 
interests of the intelligence and law enforcement sector succeeded in framing the debate. The current 
national security discourse that prioritizes the state’s role in protecting against physical harms over citizens’ 
privacy and civil rights has provided the context for this imbalance. As a result, the Investigatory Powers 
Bill has codified, maintained, or even expanded current surveillance capabilities. Policy reform in the UK has 
not led to a fundamental revision of surveillance practices, nor to a broader public debate that would help 
to democratically legitimize these practices. 
 
The fact that some (limited) policy review and debate took place and led to a more transparent 
legislative framework with a public avowal of all (known) surveillance capabilities may enhance the informed 
exercise of digital citizenship. However the range of data collection capabilities—from interception to network 
exploitation—constrains the possibilities of unimpeded digital expression and engagement. The new legal 
framework therefore causes a power shift, according to most of our interviewees, from citizens to the state. 
Yet our research also shows that the environment for digital citizenship is very much in flux and is affected 
by a complex interplay of forces, interests, and public discourses. Changes in national political coalitions, 
institutional settings, international pressures, business interests, advocacy strategies, security incidents, 
and public perception can shift the understandings of what is feasible and desirable. The shaping of a 
regulatory framework for digital citizenship is therefore ongoing. 
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